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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporations, in the form of small, doctor-owned, proprietary
hospitals1 and community or charity nonprofit hospitals,2 have per-
vaded the provision of health care services for many years. Re-
cently, however, private, for-profit corporations increasingly have
entered the health care field.3 One industry expert predicts that by
the mid-1990s, ten national firms will provide fifty percent of the
nation's medical care.4 Nationwide hospital chains, nonexistent
twenty years ago, now own or manage twelve percent of the na-
tion's hospitals.5 The proliferation of health maintenance organiza-
tions, freestanding emergency centers,' and other proprietary
health care delivery systems7 exemplify the increased commerciali-
zation of medicine. Indeed, many young physicians now shun pri-
vate practice to work as employees for corporate health care
entities.8
Despite the increased level of corporate involvement in health
1. Before 1900 physicians owned most hospitals as an extension of their practices.
These proprietary hospitals decreased in number through the first half of this century as
they were displaced by larger and more comprehensive nonprofit institutions. Accordingly,
in 1928, 2435 proprietary hospitals constituted approximately 36% of the total. Relman,
The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 963, 963 (1980).
2. See Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45 CORNELL L.Q.
432, 432 (1960).
3. Dr. Arnold Relman, editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, describes the
proliferation of for-profit corporations in health care as a "medical-industrial complex". He
views this complex as equal to the "military-industrial complex" in its potential to influence
public policy. Relman, supra note 1, at 963.
4. Hull, Four Hospital Chains, Facing Lower Profits, Adopt New Strategies, Wall St.
J., Oct. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (quoting Paul Ellwood, Jr., founder of the modern health main-
tenance organization movement).
5. Id. According to Hull:
If [these chains] have their way, health care in the future will be provided by just a
handful of huge corporations, offering services through regional networks of hospitals,
clinics and doctors. These will all be tied together by cut-rate insurance plans that
encourage patients to use the network facilities. Both insurer and hospital will be con-
trolled by the same company and advertised by a brand name. Patients will gain access
to services with a plastic membership card, much like Visa or MasterCard.
Id.
6. See infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
7. Dr. Relman lists proprietary nursing homes, home health care businesses, and kid-
ney dialysis centers as some of the for-profit entities delivering medical care. Relman, supra
note 1, at 964-65.
8. Wessell, More Young Doctors Shun Private Practice, Work as Employees, Wall St.
J., Jan. 13, 1986, at 1, col. 1. A 1983 study conducted by the American Medical Association
(AMA) found that 39% of patient-care doctors younger than 36 were employees of corpo-
rate entities or large group practices. The percentage of doctors who are employed decreases
in older age groups as follows: 23% of those between 36 and 45, 20% of those between 46
and 55, and 19% of those over 56.
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care, many states officially subscribe to a legal doctrine that pro-
hibits a corporate entity from providing medical services. 9 This
doctrine, generally known as the corporate practice of medicine
prohibition, originated within the medical profession at the turn of
the century as an ethical restriction on physicians' economic rela-
tions. 10 The leaders of the profession feared that if physicians were
permitted to work for corporations, corporations ultimately would
control physicians' level of income, their methods of treatment and
diagnosis, and their relationships with patients."
Courts accepted the corporate practice prohibition as an ex-
tension of the purposes promoted by state medical practice acts
and on public policy grounds.' 2 Generally, courts held that the doc-
trine prohibited corporations from practicing medicine through li-
censed employees or from realizing profits through the distribution
of a physician's professional services. Because the doctrine has
been applied quite differently in different jurisdictions, no clear
rule defining the scope of the corporate practice of medicine prohi-
bition has emerged.
The rule against corporate practice stands as a formidable
threat to lay entities attempting to establish health care provider
services. Physicians angered by a loss of autonomy and states at-
tempting to regulate competition in the health care field are proba-
ble parties in future corporate practice litigation. If this kind of
litigation ensues, courts should reevaluate the rationale for disal-
lowing corporations to employ or contract with physicians. Today's
health care industry is very different from the one in which the
corporate practice prohibition originated. Many of the reasons that
once existed for limiting corporate involvement in medicine no
longer apply. Accordingly, both courts and state legislatures should
clarify the doctrine's scope and modify the doctrine to reflect cur-
rent practices in the health care market.
This Note examines the development of the corporate practice
prohibition and addresses its efficacy in the modern health care
industry. Part II describes the American medical profession's
struggle to establish itself and the threat that corporate involve-
ment in medicine posed to the early profession. Part III traces the
history of the profession's ethical restraints on corporate practice
and explains the ways in which courts have applied the doctrine.
9. See infra notes 135-84 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 85-134 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 135-84 and accompanying text.
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Part IV presents recent applications of the corporate practice pro-
hibition. Finally, Part V demonstrates that the doctrine has be-
come obsolete in light of the court-ordered abolition of ethical re-
straints on physicians and the impact of modern health care
delivery alternatives.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Medical Profession's Struggle for Autonomy
Understanding the genesis of the corporate practice of
medicine prohibition requires an appreciation of the struggle of
nineteenth century physicians to establish themselves as profes-
sionals. Physicians of the period practiced in a highly competitive
environment, competing for patients not only among themselves,13
but also with "irregulars"-quacks and healing sectarians who did
not obtain a traditional medical education.14 Many considered
medicine an inferior occupation.15 Medical practice offered little fi-
nancial security' and, unless the physician came from a privileged
13. See G. ROSEN, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN MEDICAL PRACTICE 1875-1941 at 19
(1983); W. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 108 (1972); P.
STARR, THE SoCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 77, 80 (1982).
14. D. KONOLD, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS 1847-1912 at 14-16 (1962); G.
ROSEN, supra note 13, at 19; see R. COE, SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICINE 193 (1970). The AMA's
Code of Ethics, as adopted in 1847, distinguished the so-called regular physician from ir-
regulars with the following language: "No one can be considered a regular practitioner, or a
fit associate in consultation, where practice is based on an exclusive dogma to the rejection
of the accumulated experience of the profession, and of the aids actually furnished by anat-
omy, physiology, pathology, and organic chemistry." C. CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANS, LAW, AND ETH-
ICS 109 (1984) (quoting Proceedings of the National Medical Conventions Held in New
York, May 1846, and in Philadelphia, May 1847, at 100 [hereinafter Proceedings]); see also
J. HALLER, AMERICAN MEDICINE IN TRANSITION 1840-1910 at 256 (1981).
The principal sectarian practitioners in the second half of the nineteenth century were
eclectics, distinguished by their use of medicines made from plants, and homeopaths, who
maintained that diseases could be cured by giving heavily diluted doses of drugs which pro-
duced symptoms similar to that of the disease. Both of these sects drew closer to regular
medicine in the twentieth century. For histories of these sects, see W. ROTHSTEIN, supra
note 13, at 217-46. Other large sects included the osteopaths and Christian Scientists. D.
KONOLD, supra note 14, at 15.
15. P. STARR, supra note 13, at 82-83. An 1851 study conducted by the newly formed
AMA tracked the careers of 12,400 men who had graduated from eight of the nation's lead-
ing colleges between 1800 and 1850. Twenty-six percent of the men entered the clergy and a
similar percentage entered law. Less than eight percent became physicians. The colleges in
the study were Amherst, Brown, Dartmouth, Hamilton, Harvard, Princeton, Union, and
Yale. Id. at 82 (citing Report of the Committee on Medical Education, 4 TRANSACTIONS OF
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 420-23 (1851)). A study published in 1882, whose sur-
vey included 39,054 alumni graduating from 58 colleges, reported proportions similar to
those published in 1851. Id. at 458 n.5.
16. Late nineteenth century evidence indicates that medicine was not a particularly
448
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background, little guarantee of increased social standing." Young
physicians did not enjoy organized professional support or the
prospect of a fixed career pattern.'"
The public regarded nineteenth century physicians with some
skepticism. Treatments popular at the time included bloodletting,
purging, and administering heavy dosages of mercury or quinine.' 9
Disenchanted with the often ineffective and sometimes fatal re-
sults of these treatments, patients turned to the irregulars and
their promises of speedy cures.20 Competition also forced some reg-
ular physicians to promote their cures and treatments aggressively,
much like the irregulars.2' The public, in turn, recognized no clear
distinction among health practitioners.
The call for a national medical convention in 1846 and the
subsequent establishment of the American Medical Association
(AMA or Association)23 grew out of physicians' dissatisfaction with
their mediocre standard of living and with the poor standing of
their profession.24 The young organization set out to establish the
preeminence of the regular medical profession in the provision of
health care by imposing higher standards on the profession and by
distinguishing it from sectarianism and quackery. 25 To achieve
lucrative occupation. An 1850 report on public health in Massachusetts showed that an av-
erage doctor in the state had annual billings of $800 and income of $600. Very few physi-
cians earned income in the thousands. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 84; see also J. HAL-
LER, supra note 14, at 234-35. By way of comparison, one economist estimates that around
1860 a working-class family's income ranged from $200 to $800; a middle class family's from
$800 to $5000, and a wealthy family's from $5000 to $10,000. See P. STARR, supra note 13,
at 84. Estimates of doctors' incomes around 1900 range from $750 to $1500. As reported by
the United States Bureau of the Census, in 1904 average incomes for all occupations except
farm labor were $540; federal employees made approximately $1000, while ministers earned
$759. Although physicians at the turn of the century did well relative to most occupations,
they likely did not stay on par with other professionals. Id. at 85; see also Markowitz &
Rosner, Doctors in Crisis: Medical Education and Medical Reform During the Progressive
Era, 1895-1915, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERIck ESSAYS IN SocIAL HISTORY 185, 188-89 (S.
Reverby & D. Rosner eds. 1979).
17. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 81, 89.
18. See id. at 88-89; G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 16.
19. See R. COE, supra note 14, at 181-82; D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 5; P. STARR,
supra note 13, at 94-95.
20. See R. COE, supra note 14, at 182; W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 125; D. Ko-
NOLD, supra note 14, at 56; J. HALLER, supra note 14, at 192.
21. See D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 19.
22. Id.
23. For a discussion of the events leading to the first convention, see D. KONOLD, supra
note 14, at 8. See also J. HALLER, supra note 14, at 212.
24. See J. HALLER, supra note 14, at 212; P. STARR, supra note 13, at 90; see also R.
COE, supra note 14, at 193.
25. See C. CHAPMAN, supra note 14, at 103; D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 16-19.
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these goals, the AMA proposed developing an ethical code under
which regulars would practice, establishing licensing requirements,
and raising the standards of medical education.
1. Ethical Code
The AMA adopted its Code of Ethics one year after the or-
ganizing convention..2  The new Code served the AMA's need for a
document that would demonstrate to the public the moral pur-
poses of the profession, grant the AMA leadership control over its
membership, and help establish a health care monopoly for regular
practitioners.27 The Code's introductory statement declaimed the
superiority of regular physicians over irregulars 28 and implied that
legal controls were necessary to prevent the "fraud and poisoning"
carried out by irregulars.29 The statement also urged physicians to
limit their ranks to those with proper moral and intellectual
training.30
The Code itself included provisions designed to distinguish
regulars from their competitors. The Code prohibited regulars
from promoting secret remedies or holding patents on medicines,
instruments, or appliances. The Code proscribed physicians' adver-
tising to enhance their reputation 1 and sought to restrict severely
any consultation or professional relationships between regulars and
irregulars. 2
26. See C. CHAPMAN, supra note 14, at 106.
27. Id. at 107; see also J. HALLER, supra note 14, at 235.
28. See C. CHAPMAN, supra note 14, at 106.
29. Id. The author of the introductory statement wrote that the law is "silent and, of
course, inoperative in the cases of both fraud and poisoning so extensively carried on by the
host of quacks who infest the land." Id. (quoting Proceedings, supra note 14, at 86-87).
30. Id. at 107. The introductory statement's author writes that physicians are the
"trustees of science and almoners of benevolence and charity." He urges physicians to
use increasing vigilance to prevent the introduction into their body of those who have
not been prepared by a suitably preparatory moral and intellectual training. . . . We
are under the strongest ethical obligations to preserve the character which has been
awarded by the most learned men and best judges of human nature to the members of
the medical profession, for general and extensive knowledge, great liberality and dig-
nity of sentiment, and prompt effusions of beneficance.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Proceedings, supra note 14, at 90).
31. See C. CHAPMAN, supra note 14, at 109; D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 19.
32. See C. CHAPMAN, supra note 14, at 109; D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 22; W. ROTH-
STEIN, supra note 13, at 83. The Code prohibited any consultation with one whose practice
was "based on exclusive dogma to the rejection of the accumulated experience of the profes-
sion." C. CHAPMAN, supra note 14, at 109. For the full text of the consultation restriction, see
supra note 14. See also D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 22. The AMA strictly enforced this
prohibition. In 1858 the Association censured a member who had recommended for a partic-
ular position a doctor who previously had been expelled from the AMA for selling patent
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2. Licensing Legislation
The Code, although effective in consolidating the members of
the regular medical profession, was only partially successful in bet-
tering the livelihood of physicians and in permitting the regulars to
realize exclusive control over the practice of medicine.3 In the
1870s some of the more liberal regular physicians, frustrated by
the lack of progress, collaborated with the more respected healing
sects34 to win passage of some minimal licensing statutes.35 These
first licensing statutes typically required nothing more than a di-
ploma to practice medicine.3 6 At the time, students could obtain
diplomas from medical colleges, none of which were subject to any
standardized curricula requirements or oversight.3 7 Later statutes
created state licensing boards to review diplomas and reject candi-
dates from schools the boards deemed inadequate s.3  By 1905 all
but three states required candidates not only to hold an acceptable
diploma, but also to pass an independent state examination. 9
medicines. The member's recommendation was deemed a violation of the consultation re-
striction. The AMA pardoned the member only after he formally apologized for his viola-
tion. The incident remained as a warning to those physicians who considered straying from
the organization's doctrine. Id. at 23.
33. See G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 24.
34. See supra note 14.
35. See D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 28-29; P. STARR, supra note 13, at 102; see also J.
BURROW, ORGANIZED MEDICINE IN THE PROGRESSIvE ERA 58 (1977).
According to Konold, members of the medical profession succeeded in passing medical
licensing statutes early in the nineteenth century. D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 3-4. As
public respect for regular physicians declined, however, these limited controls on irregulars
were abolished. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text; D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at
7.
36. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 100. In the latter half of the nineteenth century,
obtaining a medical diploma did not necessarily mean that one obtained an adequate level
of medical training. In 1894, 21 "diploma mills" were selling degrees. One of these mills is
said to have sold 60,000 diplomas over a 40-year period. See J. HALLEP supra note 14, at
224.
37. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
38. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 104; W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 286. In 1877
Illinois passed legislation empowering a state board of medical examiners to withhold li-
censes from graduates of disreputable medical schools until graduates passed a state exami-
nation. Graduates of approved schools were licensed automatically. The year the legislation
passed, 3600 nongraduates were practicing in the state. Consequently, 1400 of them left
within one year. In 10 years 3000 were driven from medical practice. See P. STARR, supra
note 13, at 104.
39. See D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 29. In 1901, 25 states and the District of Colum-
bia required candidates to earn a diploma and pass an independent state examination.
Eleven states required only an examination and required either passage of a state exam or
presentation of a diploma from an acceptable school. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 104,
461 n.67. For a chart of all state licensing laws in effect in 1901, see Laws Regulating the
Practice of Medicine in the Various States and Territories of the United States, 37
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These increased licensing requirements eliminated many potential
doctors from medical practice.40
In addition to raising licensing standards, regulars sought to
establish themselves as the gatekeepers to medical practice by ad-
vocating legislation requiring physicians to obtain a license from
state licensing boards composed exclusively of regular physicians. 41
Unable to muster political strength against the larger sects,4 2 the
regulars compromised with the sects to create either boards on
which the sects were represented or board systems in which each
group would examine their own candidates. 43 While the regulars
had to compromise with the sects, they did realize some progress
in upgrading the standards of medical practice and in controlling
the number of practitioners." Their success prompted the AMA,
in the early twentieth century, to lobby for legal controls4 5 rather
than rely on ethical restrictions to gain superiority over irregular
practitioners.46
JA.M.A. 1318 (1901). In 1888 the United States Supreme Court passed on the legitimacy of
medical licensing requirements in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1888). Dr. Dent was
an eclectic physician, see supra note 14, who had been in practice for six years. The State
Board of Health ruled Dr. Dent's diploma from the American Medical Eclectic College of
Cincinnati, Ohio to be unacceptable. Id. at 118. The state convicted and fined Dr. Dent
under an 1882 statute requiring a physician to hold a degree from a reputable medical
school, pass the state examination, or prove that the physician had been practicing for the
past 10 years. Id. at 115-16, 118. In a unanimous decision the Court upheld the law, noting
that states have the power to regulate entry into a vocation when the regulation is not ap-
plied arbitrarily and when the regulation's purpose is the protection of the public welfare.
Id. at 122-24.
The Court's decision in Dent legitimized the efforts of the early medical establishment
to control entrance into its ranks. The decision also is noteworthy because it indicates how
the medical profession, by 1888, had gained status and public respect. "Few professions,"
stated the Court, "require more careful preparation . . . than that of medicine." Id. at 122.
According to the Court, the medical profession deals "with all those subtle and mysterious
influences upon which health and life depend, and requires not only a knowledge of the
properties of vegetable and mineral substances, but of the human body in all its complicated
parts, and their relation to each other, as well as their influence upon the mind." Id. Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that "comparatively few can judge . . . the qualifications of
learning and skill which [the doctor] possesses." Id.
40. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 118; supra note 38.
41. See J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 58.
42. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
43. See J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 58-59 & 162 app. (listing the structures of medi-
cal boards by state as of 1917); D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 29.
44. See D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 29-30; W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 287
(showing table of the number of medical schools, students, and graduates, by sect, from
1850-1920).
45. D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 31.
46. Id. at 30-31; see C. CHAPMAN, supra note 14, at 113; W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13,
at 298.
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3. Medical Education Reform
Although improvement of medical education was a principal
reason for the AMA's formation,47 the organization met with little
initial success in gaining acceptance of its proposed reforms.48
Medical schools and physicians who took on apprentices offered
the most resistance to specified preliminary education require-
ments and stronger medical curricula.' 9 Educational reform stood
contrary to the interests of schools, which competed for students'
tuition, and physicians, which competed for apprenticeship fees
and office assistance.50 Resistance to higher standards continued as
medical schools, and competition among them, proliferated after
the Civil War. 1
Licensing requirements, which brought minimal standards to
medical education, were not stifling the operation of low-grade
medical colleges."2 Without higher educational standards, entry
into the medical profession was available to virtually everyone
through the weaker university programs and privately owned
schools.53 Professional leaders did not believe that graduates of
these programs possessed the qualifications attendant upon true
professionals.5 These leaders also felt that producing low-quality
47. The impetus for the original AMA convention came in part from the New York
State Medical Society's discussions about educational reform in that state. The society's
leaders realized that stricter standards in one state simply would drive students to neighbor-
ing states for a medical education. Thus, some type of national effort was necessary. See D.
KONOLD, supra note 14, at 8; W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 114; P. STARR, supra note 13,
at 90-91. Three of the six resolutions adopted during the first convention were related to
educational reform. See C. CHAPMAN, supra note 14, at 105.
48. See D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 16-17; W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 115-16.
The AMA's first educational proposal called for three years of study with a preceptor, in-
cluding two courses at a medical college. In addition, the proposal recommended that col-
leges have a seven member staff, extend lecture courses from four to six months, require
three months of dissection training, and offer one session of hospital training. See D. Ko-
NOLD, supra note 14, at 16. For an account of the AMA's efforts in educational reform
through the second half of the 1900s, see id. at 17-19.
49. See D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 16-17; W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 116.
50. See W. ROTHSTmIN, supra note 13, at 116-17.
51. See D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 19; W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 286, 291.
52. Some of the requirements simply were ignored unless the licensing agency en-
forced them. Furthermore, the licensing examination, when required, was not so difficult
that the inept could not pass. See W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 291.
53. See W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 291-92; P. STARR, supra note 13, at 116-17.
54. See J. BURROW. supra note 35, at 31. Burrow recounts some observations made in
the first decade of the twentieth century:
At the Tulane University School of Medicine, George Dock testified to the virtual illit-
eracy of his third-year students whose assaults on orthography included "inflaimed,"
"bowalls," "simptom," "tetnas," "puss," and "irruption." Lincoln Cothran, as a mem-
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graduates not only resulted in too much competition, but also
hampered efforts to raise the societal status of physicians.5
Soon after the AMA's reorganization at the beginning of the
twentieth century and the AMA's establishment as the profession's
central source of power and policy-making,56 the AMA declared
medical education reform a top priority.57 By dictating medical
school entrance requirements, strengthening curricula, and length-
ening the required time of study, the AMA sought to control both
the quality and the level of competition within the profession. 58
The AMA achieved its goals in relatively few years. 5 The new re-
quirements increased students' tuition and required greater time
commitments, which consequently increased lost earnings to a
point at which many students no longer could afford to attend
medical schools.6 0 In addition, the new requirements rendered pri-
her of the California State Board of Medical Examiners, found graduates in their "un-
tutored earnestness" offering such approximations as "tung," "bludvescles," "dy-
afram," "uren," and "recktum." Henry Beates, Jr., President of the Medical Council of
Pennsylvania, declared that of the papers he graded on licensing examinations some 30
or 40 percent represented appalling examples of illiteracy. George M. Gould, a promi-
nent medical editor, complained that three-fourths of the four-thousand annual gradu-
ates of medical institutions could not practice medicine intelligently. Laying much of
the blame for degraded standards on commercial medical colleges, Charles H. Wallace,
while president of the Missouri Medical Association observed, "These student hunters
entice the barber from his chair, the mechanic from his bench and the huckster from
his wagon, all with imperfect education, and push them by roseate pictures into the
field of medicine. What can such conditions bring forth [he asked] but imperfectly-
feathered fledglings who flutter along the marshes and never rise to the dignified
heights of the real physician.
Id. at 31.
55. See Markowitz & Rosner, supra note 16, at 189-90; G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 64;
P. STARR, supra note 13, at 117.
56. For a description of the AMA's reorganization and consolidation of power, see J.
BURROW, AMA: VOIcE OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 27-53 (1963). See also W. ROTHSTEIN, supra
note 13, at 316-20.
57. See G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 62; P. STARR, supra note 13, at 117; see also J.
BURROW, supra note 35, at 33; J. BURROW, supra note 56, at 33.
58. See J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 32; G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 36, 61-66. For an
account of the AMA's early objectives in educational reform, see J. BURROW, supra note 35,
at 33-37.
59. The AMA's Council on Medical Education began inspecting schools in 1906. Out
of 161 schools inspected, 82 were deemed acceptable; 47 were thought imperfect, but re-
deemable; and 32 were unsatisfactory. These inspections were responsible in part for the
closing of 29 schools by 1910. J. HALLER, supra note 14, at 225. For a detailed discussion of
the Council's first inspection of medical schools, see J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 35-37.
60. See G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 67; see also P. STARR, supra note 13, at 118. Starr
explains as follows:
The academic year, time almost wholly lost for earnings, went from four to eight or
nine months, and the total period of training from two years, possibly without high
school, to four, then five, and eventually more than eight years beyond high school.
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vate, for-profit schools unprofitable. 1 The early 1900s witnessed a
steady decrease in the number of physicians62 and a steady in-
crease in the quality of those who became physicians. e3
Through the development and enforcement of an ethical code,
the AMA was able to organize regular physicians and distinguish
them from less reputable practitioners. By procuring passage of li-
censing legislation, the regular medical profession began to limit
competition and raise the quality of practitioners. With successes
in educational reform, the AMA further controlled competition
and advanced physicians' expertise. By the early twentieth cen-
tury, the AMA brought public respect and greater financial reward
to physicians64 and established the regular medical profession's vir-
tual control over medical care.6 5
B. The Corporate Threat To Autonomy
The AMA had been very successful in attaining autonomy for
the profession. A new threat to that autonomy, however, arose out
of corporate entities' growing involvement in medicine.6 A sub-
stantial segment of the medical profession harbored hostility to-
ward forms of organizing medical practices and methods of paying
for medical services that increased competition among indepen-
dent physicians.6 7
Under the emerging system, young doctors could scarcely hope to be making a living on
their own before age thirty.
Id.
61. State licensing boards were requiring that medical schools have modern laborato-
ries, libraries, and clinical facilities. No medical school could cover the increased expenses
with tuition alone. Thus, the privately owned schools that had no endowments or state sup-
port were forced to close. See W. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 193-94; P. STARR, supra note
13, at 118.
62. See G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 15; P. STARR, supra note 13, at 126. Starr notes
that census data indicate that in 1900 there were 173 physicians for every 100,000 people. In
1920 the ratio of doctors to population had decreased to 137 per 100,000, and to 125 per
100,000 in 1930, where the ratio remained for the next two decades.
63. See G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 66; P. STARR, supra note 13, at 123-24.
64. See supra note 16; G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 70.
65. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 127.
66. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 198-206; see also J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 119
(stating "contract practice stood out in the Progressive Era as the most dangerous threat to
whatever degree of unity the regular medical profession had achieved"); cf. G. ROSEN, supra
note 13, at 36. Contract practice did exist in the nineteenth century. See J. BURROW, supra
note 35, at 119; D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 57. The AMA, in fact, classified contract work
as a form of irregular practice as early as 1869. Physicians, however, were rarely disciplined
for participating in the schemes. See D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 57; J. HALLER, supra note
14, at 245-47.
67. See G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 36. In addition to contract and corporate practice,
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The early involvement of business corporations in medicine
took two forms. In the first form, popularly known as contract
practice, 8 corporations employed physicians to serve the medical
needs of employees.69 In the isolated industries of railroad, mining,
and lumbering, doctors contracted to treat employees for a prede-
termined salary.70 Corporations in smaller and more urban indus-
tries contracted with independent physicians to provide medical
care to the corporations' employees for a set rate per worker per
month.7 1 Under both schemes the corporation dictated the choice
of physicians.72
In the second form, known as corporate practice, for-profit
medical service companies marketed physicians' services to the
public.73 Corporate practice developed in its largest scale in Oregon
and Washington in the early 1900s. Corporations in these states
contracted with mining and lumber companies to provide medical
services to company employees for a fixed rate per worker. 74 The
corporations first employed their own doctors to perform these ser-
many physicians resented the development of health department clinics, pay clinics, group
practice, and health insurance. Id.
68. See J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 119-20; J. HALLER, supra note 14, at 245-47.
69. See J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 119-20; D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 57-58; P.
STARR, supra note 13, at 200-06. In another form of contract practice, fraternal and benevo-
lent societies contracted with doctors to provide health care to their members. Much like
the corporations in smaller industries, the societies paid doctors a fixed fee for each lodge
member in return for an indefinite volume of work. See J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 121-22;
see also P. STARR, supra note 13, at 206-09. The issues raised by lodge practice are much the
same as those that arise when corporations pay a fixed rate for medical services. This Note
does not discuss this type of contract practice.
70. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 201-02; see also J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 119-
20.
In the years following the Civil War the railroad, mining, and lumber industries em-
ployed doctors to treat victims of industrial accidents. By 1900 railroads employed more
than 6000 surgeons to treat workers, pedestrians, and passengers. As the railroads moved
West, lines would organize their own services by relocating salaried doctors to unsettled
areas. Similarly, the mining and lumbering industries were forced to provide medical ser-
vices to employees simply because of the location of their businesses. Estimates indicate
that by 1930, 530,000 railway employees, as well as an unknown number of dependents, were
covered by these industrial health programs. Passage of workers' compensation laws around
1910 also promoted this form of corporate involvement in medicine. Corporations concerned
with liability and insurance costs employed doctors to conduct regular examinations and to
attend to the health maintenance of workers. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 200-02.
71. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 202. The contracting doctor would be paid out of
deductions from the workers' paychecks. The doctor typically would receive 50 cents a
month for an unmarried man and 75 cents for a married man and his family. See J. HALLER,
supra note 14, at 146; see also J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 119.
72. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 202; J. HALLER, supra note 14, at 246.
73. See P. STARR, supra note 13, at 204-06.
74. Id. at 204-05.
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vices, but later subcontracted the work to independent doctors. Al-
though physicians founded these corporations, eventually they
were managed by lay people. Corporate management maintained
limited control over the doctors with whom they contracted. Man-
agement required second opinions before surgery, reviewed the
length of hospital stays, and refused to pay fees deemed
75excessive.
Contract and corporate practice raised myriad concerns among
the medical establishment. Contract or corporate practice, critics
argued, would force doctors to maintain a high patient load and,
thus, the quality of services delivered would deteriorate. 76 Further-
more, fixed salaries and fees repudiated the traditional fee-for-ser-
vice mechanism"7 that allowed physicians to value their own ser-
vices78 and, as a result, control their own income levels.79 Fixed
salaries and fees paid for indefinite volumes of work, however,
would result in low earnings and potential out-of-pocket expenses
for physicians.8 0
Opponents of contract and corporate practice also complained
that these schemes forced doctors to bid against each other for
contracts, thus driving their reimbursements down to unconsciona-
ble levels." The schemes also threatened the profession's monopo-
75. Id. at 205.
76. See Berlant, Medical Ethics and Monopolization, in ETHICS IN MEDICINE: HISTORI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS 61 (J. Reiser, A. Dyck & W. Curran eds.
1977).
77. See J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 119; see also G. ROSEN, supra note 13, at 4, 25.
78. See J. HALLER, supra note 14, at 242; Berlant, supra note 76.
79. Cf. D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 58 (stating that after 1892 the AMA, while per-
mitting contracts that paid doctors at or above fee-for-service rates, would not allow con-
tracts that paid less because these contracts would weaken efforts to raise physicians'
incomes).
80. See J. HALLER, supra note 14, at 246; Berlant, supra note 76. Burrow explains the
type of exploitation in which some companies engaged:
In Michigan, the Michigan Alkali Company provided contract coverage to employees
for monthly payments of fifty cents, while at Menominee, the Electrical and Mechani-
cal Company offered medical and surgical care for only fifteen cents. Mining corpora-
tions generally provided individual medical coverage for monthly payments of from
fifty cents to one dollar, while the United States Health and Accident Company gave
contract coverage in several firms for annual payments ranging from $1.50 to $3.00.
Aetna Life and Accident Company provided contract coverage to a number of firms for
employee payments of one dollar per month, but of this sum allowed physicians only 10
percent. . . . Careful estimates in 1907 of the cost of contract practice in Chicago, as
opposed to the cost of similar service under the minimum fee bill, set the annual loss to
the profession at a minimum of $750.00.
J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 123.
81. See J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 123; see also D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 58.
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listic designs by creating stiff competition with individual physi-
cians and by permitting lay persons to make policy decisions
concerning which patients a doctor could see and the amount of
services a doctor could provide.s2
Despite the obvious threat of contract and corporate practice
to the medical profession's recently established autonomy, the pro-
fession was not unified in opposition."3 Some physicians, particu-
larly those struggling to make a living, appreciated the stable in-
come obtained through a contract or corporate arrangement.
4
Nevertheless, contract and corporate practice schemes caused great
consternation among AMA members, prompting the body to enact
a series of ethical pronouncements against the schemes' use.
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE PROHIBITION
A. Ethical Restraints
1. Development of the Ethical Provisions
In one of the AMA's earliest actions concerning contract and
corporate practice, the AMA adopted a statement in 1890 declar-
ing that the schemes had "gone too far" and that "[t]oo much of
the spirit of trade has found its way into the profession, and [that]
its further encroachment should be resisted-not encouraged. '8 5 In
1911 the editors of the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion qualified the AMA's position on contract and corporate prac-
tice.86 The editors explained that the term "contract prac-
tice"-used by the AMA to cover both contract and corporate
arrangements 87-was a misnomer 8 because the term implied that
objections to the practice were grounded in the existence of a con-
82. See Berlant, supra note 76, at 61.
83. See J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 124-25.
84. Id.; see also J. HALLER, supra note 14, at 247; infra note 116.
85. In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 898 (1979) (quoting unnamed 1890
report to AMA House of Delegates).
86. See Contract Practice, 57 J.A.M.A. 145, 145 (1911); see also J. BURROW, supra
note 35, at 128.
87. Editors of the Journal of the American Medical Association noted that "contract
practice" had come to include a broad range of contractual arrangements:
In order to discuss intelligently what is generally known as contract practice, it is nec-
essary first to define what one means by the term, since it is used to designate every-
thing from the employment of a surgeon by a railroad to lodge practice and employ-
ment of physicians by burial and aid societies.
Contract Practice, supra note 86, at 145; see supra note 68.
88. See Contract Practice, supra note 86, at 145.
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tract 9 The editors observed that all medical care arises from a
contract, either express or implied, between a doctor and patient.90
The objection to contract practice, the editors stated, was only to
the use of unfair contracts. 1
The editors highlighted four parties requiring consideration in
the context of medical care provision: the physician, the patient,
the medical profession, and the public.2 The editors argued that a
physician could, without objection, enter into a contractual ar-
rangement if none of the four parties suffered injury as a result.93
The editors offered rough criteria by which local societies might
test contract schemes. The societies were to examine the economic
justification for the contract, the possibility of harm, and the op-
portunity for middlemen to exploit physicians. 4
In 1912 the AMA confronted the contract and corporate prac-
tice issue for the first time in the Association's listing of ethical
canons,9 5 known at this time as the Principles of Medical Ethics.9 6
The Principles did not offer any clear guidelines by which to judge
contract schemes. Rather, the 1912 provision simply condemned as
"unprofessional" any contractual arrangement that required physi-
cians to perform under conditions that made "it impossible to
render adequate service" or that "interfere[d] with reasonable
competition among the physicians of a community. ' '97
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The AMA recommended that local societies ask the following three questions
when judging a contract scheme:
1. Is there an economic justification for such an agreement?
2. Is the contract such a one that no one will be harmed thereby?
3. Is it a direct agreement between the physician and the patient or is the physician
being exploited for the benefit of a middleman?
Id.; see also J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 128.
95. See Laufer, Ethical and Legal Restrictions on Contract and Corporate Practice of
Medicine, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 516, 518 (1939); see also In re American Medical Ass'n,
94 F.T.C. at 1011 n.59.
96. The AMA's original Code of Ethics was revised and retitled Principles of Medical
Ethics in 1903. The profession complained that the Code was too rigid and unbecoming of
professionals. The Principles were thought more becoming of the honorable persons in the
profession. See D. KONOLD, supra note 14, at 68-70.
97. In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 1011 n.59. The provision stated:
It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his services under conditions that
make it impossible to render adequate service to his patient or which interfere with
reasonable competition among the physicians of a community. To do this is detrimen-
tal to the public and to the individual physician, and lowers the dignity of the
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The 1912 provision did not eliminate or even reduce signifi-
cantly suspect contract arrangements9 s In 1927 the AMA's House
of Delegates"" approved, but did not formally introduce into the
Principles, criteria suggested by the Judicial Council 00 to deter-
mine whether a contract for medical services was ethical. 10 1 The
Judicial Council noted that contract-style arrangements were "en-
tering into so many phases of the practice of medicine as to be a
distinct menace to the stability of [the AMA]. '102
In 1927 the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, a na-
tional commission funded through private philanthropies, con-
vened to study the country's health care system.103 In 1932 the
Committee recommended the expanded use of contract-style prac-
tice through group prepaid medical practice.104 Many of the Com-
mittee's physician members, including some AMA officials, drafted
a Minority Report opposing the Committee's recommendations. 10 5
Relying on the contract practice criteria developed by the Judicial
Council in 1927, the minority criticized group prepaid practice.
The minority claimed that group practice contracts lead to the so-
licitation of patients, created competition among physicians, and
demoralized the profession. 1 8
profession.
Id. (quoting 1912 version of Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA).
98. See Laufer, supra note 95, at 518.
99. The House of Delegates is the AMA's official legislative and policy-making body.
For details concerning the House's composition and powers, see In re American Medical
Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 710-11.
100. The Judicial Council is responsible for interpreting the AMA Constitution and
Bylaws and the Principles of Medical Ethics. Id. at 711. The Council is composed of five
physicians who are nominated by the AMA president and elected by the House of Dele-
gates. Id. at 801-02.
101. The Judicial Council's report followed a 1926 request by the House of Delegates
to investigate the contract and corporate practice issue. Id. The criteria developed by the
Council eventually were incorporated in the Principles of Medical Ethics. For a listing of
the criteria as finally adopted, see infra note 111.
102. In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 898.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The Minority Report voiced the following concerns:
One of the strongest objections to industrial medical services, mutual benefit associa-
tions, so-called health and hospital associations, and other forms of contract practice is
that there has been found no means of preventing destructive competition between
individuals or groups concerned with these movements. This injects a type of commer-
cialism into medical practice which is harmful to the public and the medical profession
and results in inferior quality of medical service.
One of the pernicious effects of contract practice schemes is that each of them
stimulates the launching of other similar schemes until there are many in the field
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The AMA's House of Delegates endorsed the Minority Report
in 1933, noting that the Report expressed the collective opinion of
the medical profession. 10 7 That same year, the House replaced the
1912 provision on contract practice. 10 8 The new provision defined
contract practice as an agreement between a physician or a group
of physicians and an entity, such as a corporation, organization,
political subdivision, or individual, to provide medical services to a
group of individuals on the basis of a fee schedule, for a salary, or
for a fixed rate per capita.109 The provision stated that not all con-
tract practice was per se unethical, but adopted the criteria formu-
lated by the Judicial Council in 1927110 for determining which con-
tracts were unacceptable."'
In 1934 the House of Delegates added another ethical provi-
sion bearing on contract practice. 12 Entitled "Direct Profits to Lay
Groups," the provision condemned arrangements in which a lay
entity directly profited from compensation received by a physician
for providing medical services. 113 Both the general provision on
competing with each other. The first may have safeguards against many of the abuses
of contract practices, but as new ones are formed the barriers are gradually broken
down in order to secure business.
Id. at 1013 (quoting Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, Medical Care for the Ameri-
can People, Minority Report (1932)).
107. In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 899.
108. Id.
109. See Laufer, supra note 95, at 519 (quoting Principles of Medical Ethics of the
AMA, ch. III, art. VI, § 2, published in AMERICAN MEDICAL DIRECTORY 15 (15th ed. 1938));
see also In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 896.
110. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
111. The 1933 provision listing the conditions which made contracts unethical reads as
follows:
Contract practice per se is not unethical. However, certain features or conditions if
present make a contract unethical, among which are: 1. When there is solicitation of
patients, directly or indirectly. 2. When there is underbidding to secure the contract. 3.
When the compensation is inadequate to assure good medical service. 4. When there is
interference with reasonable competition in a community. 5. When free choice of a
physician is prevented. 6. When the conditions of employment make it impossible to
render adequate service to the patients. 7. When the contract because of any of its
provisions or practical results is contrary to sound public policy.
Each contract should be considered on its own merits and in the light of surround-
ing conditions. Judgment should not be obscured by immediate, temporary or local
results. The decision as to its ethical or unethical nature must be based on the ultimate
effect for good or ill on the people as a whole.
Laufer, supra note 95, at 519 (quoting Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA, ch. III, art.
VI, § 2, published in AMERICAN MEDICAL DIRECTORY 15 (15th ed. 1938)).
112. See Laufer, supra note 95, at 519; see also In re American Medical Ass'n, 94
F.T.C. at 899.
113. See Laufer, supra note 95, at 519; see also In re American Medical Ass'n, 94
F.T.C. at 899. The provision reads as follows:
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contract practice criteria, adopted in 1933,11' and the prohibition
on lay entity profit-taking, added in 1934, survived as part of the
AMA's ethical doctrine through the 1970s. 5
2. Analysis of the Ethical Provisions
The language of the 1933 and 1934 provisions indicates the
struggle that the AMA faced on the contract and corporate prac-
tice issue. The AMA did not totally prohibit contract and corpo-
rate practice; the Association recognized that contract-style
schemes were justifiable in certain cases. 1 6 The AMA also recog-
nized that many physicians needed the contract and corporate
work to survive in the profession." 7 Conversely, the AMA desired
to prevent what it considered to be the unacceptable consequences
of contract and corporate practice.
One of the unacceptable consequences of contract schemes was
the commercialism of the medical profession. The AMA's concern
over commercialism is manifest in the unambiguous language of
the 1934 provision's prohibition against lay entities profiting from
physicians' services.11  This kind of profit splitting, states the pro-
vision, lowers the dignity of the medical profession and creates un-
fair competition. 1' 9 Commercialism also might lead to lay involve-
ment in physicians' decisionmaking and to interference with the
It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his professional attainments or ser-
vices to any lay body, organization, group or individual, by whatever name called, or
however organized, under terms or conditions which permit a direct profit from the
fees, salary or compensation received to accrue to the lay body or individual employing
him. Such a procedure is beneath the dignity of professional practice, is unfair compe-
tition with the profession at large, is harmful alike to the profession of medicine and
the welfare of the people, and is against sound public policy.
Laufer, supra note 95, at 519 (quoting Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA, ch. III, art.
VI, § 5, published in AMERICAN MEDICAL DIRECTORY 15 (15th ed. 1938)).
114. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
115. Before being struck down by the Federal Trade Commission in 1979, see infra
notes 220-47 and accompanying text, the substance of both provisions was included in the
Judicial Council's Opinions and Reports, its periodical of authoritative ethical interpreta-
tions. See In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 899.
116. See J. BURROW, supra note 35, at 124, 128; see also Laufer, supra note 95, at 518.
117. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. According to Mr. Laufer, the economic
realities of the Depression compelled many physicians to consider contract work. In 1934
the Judicial Council warned that "many of the members of the AMA are straining at their
ethical leashes." Laufer, supra note 95, at 519 (construing Report of the Judicial Council,
102 JA.MA. 1497 (1934)).
118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
119. Id. The Minority Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care ex-
presses similar concerns. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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fidelity of the doctor-patient relationship. 120 While these concerns
are not stated expressly in the 1934 provision, they may be implied
from language warning that direct profiting is detrimental to the
public welfare and is against public policy. 1' 1 Commercialism by
lay entities threatened physicians' status, financial security, and
professional autonomy. After their long struggle to establish these
characteristics as norms of the profession, 122 physicians would not
allow them to be put at risk.
In contrast to the definitive prohibition against any form of
commercial contract practice, the 1933 provision regulates non-
commercial contract arrangements by proscribing only those ar-
rangements with undesirable features. 23 The features deemed un-
ethical represent familiar concerns of the profession. The 1933
provision condemns contracts that create more than "reasonable
competition" in a community. 124 The provision also disallows the
competitive practices of solicitation to obtain patients and un-
derbidding to obtain contracts. 25 Furthermore, the 1933 provision
evidences concern for professional autonomy. The provision pro-
hibits contracts in which conditions of employment prevent physi-
cians from rendering adequate services.' 2 Finally, by requiring
that patients be free to choose their physicians, 27 the provision
limits the amount of outside interference with the doctor-patient
relationship.
Although the list of unethical features in the 1933 provision
may appear comprehensive, the AMA actually granted great dis-
cretion to the local societies judging the contract schemes. The
1933 provision states that contracts should be considered on their
merits and in view of the surrounding circumstances. 28 The provi-
sion also states that the ethical nature of contracts must be deter-
mined with regard to their ultimate effect on the public. 29 Even
within the provision's list of criteria, enough ambiguities exist to
justify the broad range of conclusions reached by local societies on
contract schemes. Minds reasonably could differ on what consti-
120. See Laufer, supra note 95, at 518.
121. See supra note 113.
122. See supra notes 13-65 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 111.
124. See id. (clause 4).
125. See id. (clauses 1 & 2).
126. See id. (clause 6).
127. See id. (clause 5).
128. See id. (concluding paragraph).
129. See id.
19871
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:445
tutes "adequate compensation, ' 13° "reasonable competition, ' 1 31 or
"sound public policy."'3 2
By permitting discretion at the local level, the AMA allowed
some members of the profession to practice through contracts and
corporations. In particular, the AMA's system of ethical restric-
tions permitted nonprofit and public corporations to offer physi-
cians' services. 3 Simultaneously, the AMA articulated sufficient
objective criteria to check overreaching contract arrangements"3
and succeeded in establishing the general perception that corpora-
tions were unhealthy for medicine.
B. Legal Restraints
1. Medical Practice Acts
Legal restraints, in the form of state medical practice acts and
public policy considerations, provide a second barrier to the corpo-
rate practice of medicine. Courts have cited state medical practice
acts as implying a prohibition against corporate medical prac-
tice.'3 5 While some statutes are more explicit than others with re-
gard to corporate involvement in medicine, few articulate an actual
prohibition.3 6 Most medical practice acts are simple licensure stat-
130. See id. (clause 3).
131. See id. (clause 4).
132. See id. (clause 7).
133. See Laufer, supra note 95, at 519; see also supra notes 110-11 and accompanying
text.
134. For a compilation of AMA enforcement activities concerning contract practice,
see In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 899-907.
135. See, e.g., Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932);
People v. United Medical Serv., Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936); State v. Winneshiek
Corp. Burial Ass'n, 237 Iowa 556, 22 N.W.2d 800 (1946); People v. Woodbury Dermatologi-
cal Inst., 192 N.Y. 454, 85 N.E. 697 (1908); see also Willcox, supra note 2, at 436.
136. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2400 (West Supp. 1987) The California statute
provides:
Corporations and other artificial legal entities shall have no professional rights, privi-
leges, or powers. However, the Division of Licensing may in its discretion, after such
investigation and review of such documentary evidence as it may require, and under
regulations adopted by it, grant approval of the employment of licensees on a salary
basis by licensed charitable institutions, foundations, or clinics, if no charge for profes-
sional services rendered partients is made by any such institution, foundation, or clinic.
This provision does not apply to professional corporations, see id. at § 2402 (West Supp.
1987), which are entities wholly owned by licensed physicians organized solely to provide
the medical services of the owners. Professional corporations, in turn, are subject to certain
restrictions on the contractual relationships they may have with other corporations. See
CAL. CORP. CODE § 13408.5 (West Supp. 1987).
See also COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-36-134(7) (1985) (providing that corporations other than
those authorized under the professional corporation provisions "shall not practice
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utes that list the qualifications needed to obtain a license and re-
quire that no person practice without one.13 7 Courts that derive a
rule against corporate practice from this type of statutory language
hold that a corporation, because of its nonpersonal nature, cannot
meet the qualifications of the licensure statute and, therefore, may
not practice medicine.13 8
In 1936 the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. United Medi-
cal Service, Inc.,5 9 interpreted the language of the state's medical
practice act to prevent a for-profit corporation 4 0 from providing
medical services through its clinic. 14  The Illinois act prohibited
unlicensed persons from practicing medicine. 4 2 Licensure required
passage of a state medical examination and certification that the
applicant was at least twenty-one years old and of good moral
character.4 3 The court maintained that the legislature intended
these licensure provisions to allow only individual persons to ob-
tain a medical license.14 4 The court stated that United Medical
Service, "owing to its corporate character," could not acquire a li-
cense to practice medicine.1 4 5
United Medical Service argued that the employment of li-
censed physicians by a corporation that receives the patients' fees
does not mean that the corporation is practicing medicine.'46 The
contract for payment between the corporation and the patient did
not, United Medical Service contended, interfere with the relation-
ship between the doctor and patient. 41 The court responded that
this view was against the weight of precedent, which held that the
medicine"); OHI REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.03 (Page 1985) (providing that corporations may be
formed for any purpose "other than for carrying on the practice of any profession," subject
to the statutory exception for professional corporations).
137. Satellite and Commercial Medical Clinics, Report of the Board of Trustees: Part
11, 253 J.A.M.A. 1314, 1315-17 (1985) [hereinafter Trustees Report: Part II].
138. See Willcox, supra note 2, at 438-39; Note, Cooperation in Medicine, 35 MINN. L.
REV. 373, 385 (1951).
139. 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).
140. United Medical Service provided examination and treatment services for all
physical and mental ailments by physicians and surgeons licensed by the State of Illinois.
Persons desiring the services of the clinic paid a fixed fee to the corporation, which then
paid the doctors their compensation. The corporation also advertised that it was organized
for profit. Id. at 445, 200 N.E. at 159.
141. Id. at 444, 458, 200 N.E. at 158, 164.
142. Id. at 453, 200 N.E. at 162.
143. Id. at 453-54, 200 N.E. at 162.
144. Id. at 454, 200 N.E. at 163.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 455, 200 N.E. at 163.
147. Id.
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practice of a profession requires more than the ability to employ
competent persons.148 A corporation, the court noted, does not
have the qualities necessary to practice medicine. 149
In Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners'5" the California Su-
preme Court also relied on the language of a state licensing statute
to disallow corporate practice.' 51 The court held that a for-profit
dental services corporation was illegally practicing dentistry. "The
letter of the statute," the court stated, "authorizes persons only to
engage in the practice of dentistry.' 1 52 Similar to the United Med-
ical Service court, the Parker court found that the whole system of
state licensing laws requires the licensee to possess consciousness,
learning, skill, and good moral character. The court noted that
none of these characteristics can be attributed to an artificial
entity.153
Some commentators, 54 in addition to a minority of courts, 55
have pointed to a fundamental problem with basing the corporate
practice prohibition on statutes that limit licensing to individuals.
One commentator has noted that little sense exists in extrapolating
a legislative intent to outlaw corporate practice from statutes that
unambiguously apply to individuals.'56 Medical practice acts typi-
cally refer only to "persons;" they do not mention corporations.
Thus, that commentator argues that the only sound conclusion is
148. Id.
149. Id. at 455-56, 200 N.E. at 163. The court justified its holding with a partial quota-
tion from a case it had decided one year earlier. That quotation, employed frequently by
courts to explain why a corporation could not be licensed to practice a profession, is as
follows:
To practice a profession requires something more than the financial ability to hire com-
petent persons to do the actual work. It can be done only by a duly qualified human
being, and to qualify something more than mere knowledge or skill is essential. The
qualifications include personal characteristics, such as honesty, guided by an upright
conscience and a sense of loyalty to clients or patients, even to the extent of sacrificing
pecuniary profit, if necessary. These requirements are spoken of generically as that
good moral character which is a prerequisite to the licensing of any professional man.
No corporation can qualify.
Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 360 IM. 638, 641-42, 196 N.E. 799, 800 (1935).
150. 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932).
151. Id. at 295, 14 P.2d at 71.
152. Id. (emphasis in original).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Willcox, supra note 2, at 437-42; Note, Right of Corporation to Practice
Medicine, 48 YALE L.J. 346, 348 (1938); Note, supra note 138, at 385.
155. See Bartron v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309, 2 N.W.2d 337 (1942); see also
People v. Woodbury Dermatological Inst., 192 N.Y. 454, 85 N.E. 697 (1908).
156. See Willcox, supra note 2, at 438.
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that no statutory rule exists regarding corporate practice.157 Few
courts, however, actually have interpreted licensing statutes in this
manner.
158
2. Public Policy Considerations
Policy considerations, according to commentators and courts,
provide the best rationale for a prohibiton against corporate prac-
tice. Commentators advocating a prohibition generally advance
three considerations: (1) lay control over professional judgment; (2)
commercial exploitation of the medical practice; and (3) division of
the physician's loyalty between patient and employer. 59 According
to one court, legislatures drafted medical practice acts to protect
the public from "medical quacks and charlatans"' 60 and "to insure
the quality and competency of the practitioner."'"' The three evils
noted above are thought to be prohibited implicitly by the legisla-
tive purpose of protecting the public.162
One commentator 6 ' has argued against a broad prohibition on
corporate involvement in medicine, noting, "As long as the doctors
are properly licensed and their professional activities are not inter-
fered with by unlicensed persons, the purpose of the statutes is
157. Id. at 439.
158. The South Dakota Supreme Court in Bartron did conclude that "prevention of
corporate practice was not in contemplation by the legislature" when it enacted the medical
practice act. Bartron, 68 S.D. at 320, 2 N.W.2d at 342. The provisions at issue essentially
were the same as those in People v. United Medical Serv., Inc., 362 11. 442, 200 N.E. 157
(1936), discussed at supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text, and Parker v. Board of
Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932), discussed at supra notes 150-53 and
accompanying text. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
159. See Willcox, supra note 2, at 442-43; Note, Group Health Plans: Some Legal and
Economic Aspects, 53 YALE L.J. 162, 169 (1943). For cases considering the problem of lay
control, see People v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 633 (1939); Bennett v. Indiana State Bd., 211 Ind. 678, 7 N.E.2d 977 (1937); People
v. Carroll, 274 Mich. 451, 264 N.W. 861 (1936); State v. Buhl Optical Co., 131 Ohio St. 217, 2
N.E.2d 601 (1936). For cases considering the problem of commercial exploitation, see Silver
v. Lansburgh & Bros., 111 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Funk Jewelry Co. v. State, 46 Ariz. 348,
50 P.2d 945 (1935); Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932);
Winberry v. Hallihan, 361 Ill. 121, 197 N.E. 552 (1935); State v. Boren, 36 Wash. 2d 522, 219
P.2d 566 (1950). For cases considering the problem of divided loyalty, see State Bd. of Op-
tometry v. Gilmore, 147 Fla. 776, 3 So. 2d 708 (1941); Neill v. Gimbel Bros., 330 Pa. 213, 199
A. 178 (1938); State v. National Optical Stores Co., 189 Tenn. 433, 225 S.W.2d 263 (1949);
State v. Superior Court, 17 Wash. 2d 323, 135 P.2d 839 (1943).
160. Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 F. Supp. 434, 437 (W.D.
Tex. 1974), aff'd, 421 U.S. 995 (1975).
161. Id. at 438.
162. See Note, supra note 154, at 347-48.
163. Id. at 348.
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fully effected, for no one without proper qualifications is then di-
rectly or indirectly administering to the public.' 1 64 According to
that commentator, lay officers and directors of a medical corpora-
tion should be able to supervise administrative facets of the
business.
Most courts have been reluctant to distinguish between a phy-
sician's professional services and a lay person's administrative du-
ties in a corporation that employs physicians. Instead, courts have
held that corporations are illegally practicing medicine based solely
on their employment of physicians. In United Medical Service1 65
the corporation argued unsuccessfully that owning a clinic that
employs licensed physicians and collects the fee charged to pa-
tients does not constitute the practice of medicine. 6 In Parker6 7
the corporation attempted to distinguish the professional side of
its business from the management side. In that case the corpora-
tion argued that a license was not needed to manage the "business
side" of a dentistry practice. 68 The Parker court disagreed, finding
that the law does not divide the practice of dentistry into distinct
departments. 69
A minority of courts, however, have accepted the distinction
between the professional and management facets of a medical cor-
poration. In State Electro-Medical Institute v. State the Nebraska
Supreme Court, interpreting a medical practice statute virtually
identical to the Illinois statute discussed in United Medical Ser-
vice, separated the professional aspects from the administrative as-
pects in a for-profit medical service corporation.1 70 The court
found that the intent of the statute was to assure that those per-
sons practicing medicine have sufficient personal qualifications.
The court, however, noted that "[m]aking contracts is not practic-
ing medicine' 7 ' and, thus, no restrictions exist if one is not actually
diagnosing or treating disease.' 117 2
In State ex rel. Sager v. Lewin the Missouri Court of Appeals
construed its state medical practice act as granting corporations
164. Id.
165. 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936); see supra text accompanying notes 139-49.
166. United Medical Serv., 362 IM. at 455, 200 N.E. at 163.
167. 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932); see supra text accompanying notes 150-54.
168. Parker, 216 Cal. at 295, 14 P.2d at 71.
169. Id. at 296, 14 P.2d at 72.
170. State Electro-Medical Inst. v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905); see State
Electro-Medical Inst. v. Platner, 74 Neb. 23, 103 N.W. 1079 (1905).
171. State Electro-Medical Inst., 74 Neb. at 43, 103 N.W. at 1079.
172. Id. at 43, 103 N.W. at 1079.
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the same rights as individuals to contract with physicians to pro-
vide medical care.17 3 The court found support in private hospitals'
ability to incorporate to furnish medical services through licensed
physicians. "No one has ever charged," the court stated, "that
[hospitals] were practicing medicine."'1 Another case distinguish-
ing the corporate practice of medicine from the employment of
physicians by corporations is Group Health Association v. Moor.7 5
In that case the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia did not apply the corporate practice rule to an arrange-
ment in which a health association employed physicians. The court
concluded that the physicians were independent contractors rather
than agents of the corporation. 7 6
Critics of corporate practice also point to the commercial ex-
ploitation of the medical profession that results from the corporate
employment of physicians. These critics argue that by allowing
lay-controlled corporations to provide medical services, lay people
not subject to the physicians' ethical code would be free to solicit
patients and advertise competitively. 7 7 In Bartron v. Codington
County 7 8 the South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the
practice of a profession by a for-profit corporation tended to com-
mercialize and debase that profession. 79 The court recognized that
investors would exert pressure to promote actively the sale of pro-
fessional services in order to obtain a profitable return on the in-
vestment. The court noted that the final result would be too great
an emphasis on the financial aspects and profitability of the
practice. 80
One commentator suggests that while restricting commercial-
ism is a valid concern, it does not justify prohibiting all medical
corporations. Rather, this commentator argues, the state should
employ its regulatory powers over corporations and over medicine
to eliminate commercialism in medicine.' 8 ' The commentator also
suggests that states might rely on the AMA to police questionable
173. 128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S.W. 581 (1907).
174. Id. at 155, 106 S.W. at 583.
175. 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1938), aff'd sub nor. Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107
F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
176. Id. at 446.
177. See, e.g., People v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 159, 82 P.2d 429, 430
(1938); People v. United Medical Serv., Inc., 362 IM. 442, 455, 200 N.E. 157, 163 (1936).
178. 68 S.D. 309, 2 N.W.2d 337 (1942); see supra text accompanying note 158.
179. Id. at 329, 2 N.W.2d at 346.
180. Id. at 327-28, 2 N.W.2d at 346.
181. See Note, supra note 154, at 350.
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professional activity.18 2
Finally, critics have alleged that a physician's division of loy-
alty between patient and employer is cause for prohibiting the em-
ployment of physicians by corporations. 8 3 The fidelity of the phy-
sician-patient relationship has long been viewed as crucial to the
practice of medicine. The introduction of a third party into that
relationship could divert the physician's loyalty from the patient to
the third party compensating the physician. Consequently, the
physician might be more concerned with the interests of the corpo-
ration's investors than with the interests of the physician's
patient.18 4
IV. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE
PROHIBITION
Health law practitioners note that in recent years corporate
practice prohibitions generally have been ignored; 8 5 those who
might bring corporate practice charges have accepted the inevita-
ble movement toward greater corporate involvement in
medicine. 8 6 Nevertheless, the existence of corporate practice laws
in many states threatens innovations in medical practice.' Ac-
cording to one health law attorney, corporate practice laws "are
'legal landmines,' remnants of an old and nearly forgotten war,
half-buried on a field fast being built up with new forms of health
182. Id.
183. See Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 IOWA L. REV. 209, 213
(1950); Willcox, supra note 2, at 442-43.
184. See Hansen, supra note 183, at 213.
185. See Punch, Freestanding Centers' Growth Raises Questions About Corporate
Practice Laws, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 15, 1984, at 32 (noting that states have not been
enforcing the corporate practice prohibition "simply because it became the established cus-
tom not to enforce it"); see also Rosoff, The "Corporate Practice of Medicine" Doctrine:
Has its Time Passed? 12 HEALTH L. DIG. 1, 3-4 (Supp. Dec. 1984).
186. See Rosoff, supra note 185, at 3-4; see also Punch, supra note 185 at 32 (quoting
the executive director of the National Association of Freestanding Emergency Centers, who
states that "in the near future, states' medical practice acts will be amended (to permit
corporate practice) or repealed because they're not consistent with the changing times").
187. See Rosoff, supra note 185, at 4; see also Entin, Emergicenters: A Health Care
System in Evolution, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 399, 430 (1984) (pointing out that the prohibition
against the corporate practice of medicine must be considered when establishing emer-
gicenters); Roble, Knowlton & Rosenberg, Hospital-Sponsored Preferred Provider Organi-
zations, 12 L. MED. & Soc'y 204, 207 (1984) (noting that state corporate practice prohibi-
tions must be considered when establishing preferred provider organizations); Holley &
Carlson, The Legal Context for the Development of Health Maintenance Organizations, 24
STAN. L. REV. 644, 653 (1972) (noting that before enactment of the federal HMO enabling
legislation, state corporate practice prohibitions would have restricted the development of
HMOs).
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care organizations." 188 Individuals attempting to establish new
modes of health care delivery occasionally detonate a corporate
practice landmine. Some notable examples have arisen recently in
Texas, California, and New York.
A. Texas
In Garcia v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners189 the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas up-
held provisions of the Texas Medical Practice Act against a chal-
lenge that the Act denied plaintiffs certain constitutional rights.190
Plaintiffs in Garcia wished to incorporate a lay-controlled, non-
profit organization that would provide medical services to low-in-
come persons through salaried physicians.191 The Texas Secretary
of State refused to issue a corporate charter because the incorpora-
tors were not licensed to practice medicine as required by the
state's medical practice act.1 92
In affirming the Secretary's denial of a corporate charter, the
court relied on earlier state cases 93 that found corporations to be
engaged unlawfully in the practice of medicine when the corpora-
tion employed physicians to treat patients, but required the pa-
tients to pay the medical fees directly to the corporation. 94 The
court noted that the medical profession is a "complex, esoteric"
discipline, the "administration of which by the ignorant or un-
trained, historically and inevitably leads to the exploitation of a
188. Rosoff, supra note 185, at 4.
189. 384 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
190. Id. Plaintiff's claimed that their right to equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment and their right to assemble under the first amendment were violated because
Texas law kept plaintiffs from organizing "in corporate form for the purpose of treating or
offering to treat the sick" and injured. Id. at 436.
191. Id.
192. Id. The operative statute was Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4509a (Vernon 1976),
recodified at TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987), which
required that all incorporators of a nonprofit corporation organized for the delivery of
health care to the public be persons licensed by the Texas State Board of Medical Exam-
iner. For a discussion of the reliance on medical practice acts to find a corporate prohibition,
see supra notes 135-58.
193. See Watt v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 303 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957) (holding that state statute prohibiting a doctor from permitting another to
use the doctor's license to practice medicine was violated when a physician performed medi-
cal services for salary and fees for his services were paid to a clinic not owned by physi-
cians), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 912; Rockett v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 287
S.W.2d 190, 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (same).
194. See Garcia, 384 F. Supp. at 437.
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naive public. ' 195 The court held that the state medical practice act
was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in preserv-
ing "the vitally important doctor-patient relationship, and
preventing possible abuses resulting from lay person control of a
corporation employing licensed physicians on a salaried basis.
1 96
The possible abuses indicated by the court included interference
with the doctor-patient relationship, emphasis on budget consider-
ations rather than patient care, and lay supervision over medical
procedures.1 97
B. California
California recently reaffirmed its prohibition on the corporate
practice of medicine. In 1980 the California Attorney General
noted that California courts repeatedly have held that a commer-
cial entity that engages physicians to provide medical services to
parties contracting with the entity is practicing medicine without a
license.19s The Attorney General gave two reasons for preventing
commercial entities from practicing medicine through physicians:
(1) the limitation of licensing to individuals; and (2) the interfer-
ence with the physician-patient relationship by the corporation.199
In 1982 the California Attorney General's office was asked to
render an opinion on the legality of a general business corporation
that contracts with another entity to provide physicians to treat
employees of that entity.200 These general business corporations,
known as industrial medical corporations, are lay-controlled enti-
ties that contract with physicians to do pre-employment examina-
tions and to treat employment-related injuries sustained by em-
ployees of government agencies and large corporations.2 0' The
physicians are not employees of the medical corporation; they are
independent contractors paid on a fixed-fee basis. 02
195. Id. at 438.
196. Id. at 439.
197. Id. at 440.
198. 63 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 723 (1980) (LEXIS, States library, CAAG file). The Cali-
fornia Attorney General included as support the following cases: People v. Pacific Health
Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939); Parker v. Board
of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932); and Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592, 52 P.2d 992 (1935).
199. 63 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 723.
200. See 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 223 (1982) (LEXIS, States library, CAAG file).
201. Id.
202. Id.
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The Attorney General ruled the arrangement unlawful. 0 3 He
relied on the early corporate practice cases204 and reiterated their
rationale to find a corporation's presence "incongruous in the
workings of a professional regulatory licensing scheme which is
based on personal qualification, responsibility and sanction. '205
Furthermore, the Attorney General voiced concerns over the dam-
age to the doctor-patient relationship caused by corporate involve-
ment, noting that the presence of a corporation "would give rise to
divided loyalties on the part of the professional and would destroy
the professional relationship into which it was cast. '20 6 The Attor-
ney General reached this conclusion despite the independent con-
tractor status of the physicians. 20 7
Commentators have argued that the corporate practice prohi-
bition should not apply to a physician's independent contractor ar-
rangement with a corporation because in this arrangement the cor-
poration cannot exercise control over the physician's relationship
with a patient.0 8 Most hospitals, as a matter of course, engage
physicians as independent contractors. California, however, still re-
lies on a pair of fifty-year-old cases 209 holding that the evils of cor-
porate involvement are present whether physicians are employees
or independent contractors of a corporation that provides medical
care to the general public. 21 0
As recently as 1983 a California Court of Appeals faced the
corporate practice doctrine in a context analogous to medical prac-
tice. In California Association of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle
Vision Center, Inc. 11 the court affirmed a trial court's decision to
issue a preliminary injunction to prevent Pearle from operating re-
203. Id.
204. The California Attorney General cited People v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d
156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939), and Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592, 52 P.2d 992 (1935).
205. 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 223 (1982) (LEXIS, States library, CAAG file).
206. Id.
207. Id. at n.4.
208. See Note, supra note 159, at 167; Note, Corporations-Hospitals Illegally En-
gaged in the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 143, 144-45 (1956); see
also Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445, 446 (D.D.C. 1938) (holding that "[iut is
true that a corporation can act only through its agents and employees, but the physicians
with whom the plaintiff makes contracts are rather in the position of independent contrac-
tors, and the plaintiff does not in any way undertake to control the manner in which they
attend or prescribe for their patients").
209. See supra notes 201 & 208.
210. See 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 223 n.4 (1982) (LEXIS, States library, CAAG file).
211. 143 Cal. App. 3d 419, 191 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983).
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tail opthalmic dispensing outlets.21 The court noted the state's
historic policy against lay interference with the treatment decisions
of healing arts practitioners.213 The court examined Pearle's
franchise agreement and found that the corporation exercised ex-
tensive control over the franchisee's/optometrist's practice-both
its treatment decisions and its financial operations.214 This evi-
dence of control established to the court's satisfaction that Pearle
intended to practice the profession of optometry.215 In upholding
the lower court's injunction, the appeals court pointed to the de-
structive effect of corporate practice on the fidelity of the doctor-
patient relationship and noted the potential for commercial
exploitation.21 6
C. New York
New York's Attorney General recently obtained a consent de-
cree against Nutri/System, Inc. based in part on the corporate
practice prohibition.217 Nutri/System, an operator of franchised
weight control centers, had been employing physicians on a sala-
ried basis to conduct physical examinations and other medical ser-
vices for enrollees. 218 Furthermore, before the consent decree, the
corporation decided which medical services would be provided to
consumers and directed physicians to perform the services.219
212. Id. at 434-35, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
213. Id. at 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 768 (citing Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216
Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932)).
214. Pearle Vision Center, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 768. Pearle re-
quired that only Pearle frames and lenses be stocked, that optical goods meet the company's
specifications, and that the optometrist's choice of laboratory be approved by Pearle. The
franchisor also exercised financial control over the optometrist. Franchisees were required to
pay a substantial percentage of gross income as a franchise fee and advertising contribution.
Franchisees also had to employ Pearle's "system" in operating the practice and were subject
to periodic audits by the company. Id.
215. Id. at 434, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
216. Id.
217. See Trustees Report: Part II, supra note 137, at 1318. Details of the consent
decree are not available.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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V. DEMISE OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE PROHIBITION
A. Abolition of Ethical Restraints: American Medical
Association v. Federal Trade Commission
Despite the above instances of the doctrine's enforcement,
more telling events indicate a bleak future for the corporate prac-
tice prohibition. The doctrine suffered a significant blow when the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ordered220 the AMA to modify
its ethical restrictions on physicians' contractual arrangements to
bring them in line with federal antitrust laws.
In 1975, the year the FTC initiated its action, the AMA was
operating under the 1957 version of its Principles of Medical Eth-
ics.2 21 The ethical provision at issue, Section 6, stated that a physi-
cian should not provide services under conditions that might pre-
vent the physician from exercising medical judgment with
complete freedom or that might deteriorate the quality of medical
care.2 22 On its face, the language contained in the ethical provision
posed little threat to physicians' freedom to contract. The authori-
tative interpretation of the Section, however, which was formu-
lated by the AMA's Judicial Council223 and articulated in the 1971
edition of the Council's Opinions and Reports,224 contained lan-
guage virtually identical to the 1933 and 1934 provisions restricting
contract-style practices.225 Much like the 1933 provision,220 Opin-
ion 3 of Section 6 listed the types of contractual arrangements
deemed unethical by the Judicial Council.227 These included ar-
220. [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,955 (1982).
221. See In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 801 (1979). The complete 1957
version of the Principles of Medical Ethics is set forth in American Medical Ass'n v. Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443, 446 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980), af'd, 455 U.S. 476 (1982). In its
decision the FTC explains that "[p]romulgation and enforcement of this ethical code has
been a significant function of the AMA since its inception." In re American Medical Ass'n,
94 F.T.C. at 801.
222. See In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 896.
223. See supra note 100.
224. The Judicial Council's ethical interpretations are published periodically in Opin-
ions and Reports. The AMA distributes the publication to medical societies, physicians and
medical students. See In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 802.
225. See In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 1011-18; see also supra notes
109-13 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 111.
227. See In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 896. The list of unacceptable
contract conditions reads as follows:
(a) When the compensation received is inadequate based on the usual fees paid for the
same kind of service and class of people in the same community.
(b) When the compensation is so low as to make it impossible for competent service to
be rendered.
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rangements that permitted solicitation of patients and underbid-
ding to secure contracts.228 Contracts that unreasonably denied
free choice of physicians22 e or provided for inadequate compensa-
tion23 0 also were unacceptable to the AMA.
Likewise, Opinion 5 of Section 6 is similar to the 1934 provi-
sion.231 Opinion 5 states that "a physician should not dispose of his
professional attainments or services to any hospital, corporation or
lay body by whatever name called or however organized under
terms or conditions which permit the sale of the services of that
physician by such agency for a fee. '232 Opinion 4 of Section 6 ac-
knowledged that an increasing number of physicians were taking
positions that permitted lay entities to profit from the physicians'
services. These arrangements, the Judicial Council noted, "are in
direct and unethical competition with the profession at large. "233
Finally, Opinion 8 declared unethical the accepting of a salaried
hospital position to provide medical care in emergency room
settings.3 4
The FTC found that the above restrictions on the contractual
arrangements of physicians had three anticompetitive effects.23 5
First, the provisions sought to limit price competition among doc-
tors by fixing the adequacy of compensation and by prohibiting
competitive bidding.236 Second, the provisions inhibited competi-
tion by limiting hospitals, prepaid health plans, and lay entities to
the traditional fee-for-service method of compensation and by pro-
scribing their use of salaries and other more cost-efficient payment
methods.23 7 Last, the provisions restricted arrangements between
(c) When there is underbidding by physicians in order to secure the contract.
(d) When a reasonable degree of free choice of physicians is denied those cared for in a
community where other competent physicians are readily available.
(e) When there is solicitation of patients directly or indirectly.
Id. (quoting Judicial Council of the AMA, Opinions and Reports (1971)).
228. See supra note 227 (clauses (c) & (e)); supra note 125 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 227 (clause (d)); see also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 227 (clauses (a) & (b)); see also supra note 111.
231. See supra note 113.
232. In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 896-97.
233. Id. at 897.
234. Id. For examples of instances in which the AMA utilized its ethical restrictions on
contract practice, see id. at 899-907.
235. Id. at 1011-12.
236. Id. at 1014.
237. Id. at 1016. The FTC found that the AMA's purpose of permitting only fee-for-
service compensation was "to retain for the physician the full profit generated by his or her
services and to preclude competition by group health plans, hospitals and other organiza-
tions not directly under the control of physicians." Id.
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physicians and nonphysicians and, therefore, prevented the crea-
tion of more economical business structures.238
Based on these findings, the FTC concluded that Section 6 of
the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics and the corresponding in-
terpretations constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.2 39 In
1979 the FTC issued its Final Order requiring the AMA to elimi-
nate these ethical restrictions.240 The Order was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ap-
proved the Order's enforcement after only minor modifications.21
A divided Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision in
1982.242 The Order took effect that same year.243 The Order re-
quires the AMA to cease and desist from (1) promulgating any eth-
ical restraints concerning the payment method employed by physi-
cians in contracting with any entity that offers the physician's
services to the public, and (2) inhibiting the development of any
entity that offers physicians' services to the public by commenting
on the ethical propriety of nonphysician ownership or management
of that entity.2 4 4 In addition, the FTC Order required the AMA to
238. Id. at 1017-18. The AMA argued that restrictions on physician-nonphysician col-
laboration were meant to prevent situations in which nonphysicians might advocate medi-
cally unsound treatment and to prevent consumers from believing that nonphysician part-
ners have medical skills and training. Id. at 1017. The Commission, however, found that
"[it is difficult to see how such sweeping ethical proscriptions are needed to prevent decep-
tion or to prevent non-physicians from having undue influence over medical procedures." Id.
at 1018.
239. Id. at 1014-18.
240. Id. at 1036-40.
241. See American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443, 453 (2d Cir.
1980). For details of these modifications, see id. at 452-53.
242. American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). The Su-
preme Court affirmed the appeals court decision per curiam by a divided vote.
243. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
244. See [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,955 at 22,418-19.
The section of the FTC Order relevant to contract practice is stated in full as follows:
It is further Ordered that respondent American Medical Association, .. do forthwith
cease and desist from:
A. Restricting, regulating, impeding, advising on the ethical propriety of, or inter-
fering with the consideration offered or provided to any physician in any contract with
any entity that offers physicians' services to the public, in return for the sale, purchase
or distribution of his or her professional services, except for professional peer review of
fee practices of physicians;
B. Restricting, interfering with, or impeding the growth, development or opera-
tions of any entity that offers physicians' services to the public, by means of any state-
ment or other representation concerning the ethical propriety of medical service ar-
rangements that limit the patient's choice of a physician;
C. Restricting, interfering with, or impeding the growth, development or opera-
tions of any entity that offers physicians' services to the public, by means of any state-
ment or other representation concerning the ethical propriety of participation by non-
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remove all provisions inconsistent with the above requirements
from the AMA's constitution and bylaws, its Principles of Medical
Ethics, and the Judicial Council's Opinions and Reports.24 5
Although antitrust violations, not the corporate practice doc-
trine, provided the impetus behind the FTC action against the
AMA, the Commission's Order does have important implications
for the doctrine. As described earlier, the rule against corporate
practice emerged from the AMA's early efforts to protect the medi-
cal profession's autonomy and prestige.24 The AMA's adoption of
restrictions on corporate practice into its ethical code247 helped es-
tablish the prohibition against contract-style schemes as accepted
doctrine. Thus, the recent abolition of these ethical restrictions
greatly weakens the foundation upon which the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine was built.
B. Impact of Modern Health Care Delivery Systems
Changes in the health care industry also have contributed to
the demise of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. The in-
dustry has evolved in recent years in an environment of price sen-
physicians in the ownership or management of said organization; and
D. Inducing, urging, encouraging, or assisting any physician, or any medical associ-
ation, group of physicians, hospital, insurance carrier or any other non-governmental
organization to take any of the actions prohibited by this Part.
Id.
245. See id. at 22,419. Part IV of the Order sets out some of the measures required of
the AMA with regard to informing its membership of the abolished ethical restraints:
It is Further Ordered that respondent American Medical Association:
B. For a period of ten years, provide each new member of respondent and each
constituent and component organization of respondent with a copy of this Order at the
time the member is accepted into membership.
C. Within ninety (90) days after this Order becomes final, remove from respondent
American Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics and the Judicial Coun-
cil's Opinions and Reports, and from the constitution and bylaws and any other ex-
isting policy statement or guideline of respondent, any provision, interpretation or pol-
icy statement which is inconsistent with the provisions of Parts I and II of this Order
and, within one hundred and twenty (120) days after this Order becomes final, publish
in the Journal of the American Medical Association and in American Medical News
the revised versions of such documents, statetments, or guidelines.
Id.
The AMA adopted a new version of the Principles of Medical Ethics in 1980 after the
FTC handed down the original Final Order in October 1979. This version excluded all refer-
ences to economic restraints on physicians. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. For
a full version of the 1980 Principles, see American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
638 F.2d 443, 456 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980).
246. See supra notes 14-84 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 85-134 and accompanying text.
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sitivity and growing competition.24 8 One product of this evolution
is the expanded provision of medical services by corporate enti-
ties. 24 19 In their efforts to provide medical services in a cost-con-
scious environment, corporations have introduced alternative sys-
tems of health care delivery that are inconsistent with the
traditional notions of professional autonomy and that contravene
the underpinnings of the corporate practice doctrine.2 50 Two of the
alternative delivery systems, health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) and freestanding emergency clinics (FECs), are described
below and analyzed for their impact on the corporate practice
prohibition.
1. Health Maintenance Organizations
a. Structure and Function
Health maintenance organizations provide comprehensive
health benefits to subscribers in exchange for fixed periodic pay-
ments. 251 HMOs contract with a variety of health care profession-
als for the provision of services to subscribers. These professionals
are not paid based on services performed, but at a set annual rate
per HMO subscriber. 52
Proponents of HMOs argue that HMOs offer a sensible alter-
native to the traditional fee-for-service system of payment s.25  Be-
248. See Gray, An Introduction to the New Health Care for Profit, in THE NEW
HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT 1, 3-5 (B. Gray ed. 1983).
249. See Relman, supra note 1, at 963; P. STARR, supra note 13, at 428-40.
250. Bradford Gray notes that for-profit corporations are not alone in responding to a
competitive health care market. Not-for-profit institutions have been "forming chains, es-
tablishing for-profit subsidiaries, selling services to other hospitals for profit, and taking on
other attributes of the for-profit enterprises." Gray, supra note 248, at 3.
251. See J. KRESS & J. SINGER, HMO HANDBOOK 13 (1975); Rosoff, The Federal HMO
Assistance Act: Helping Hand or Hurdle?, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 137, 138-39 (1975); Stern,
Health Care Expansion: Provisions of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 8
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 89, 89 (1974).
252. See J. KRESS & J. SINGER; supra note 251, at 15; Stern, supra note 251, at 89;
Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARv.
L. REV. 887, 890 (1977). For a sample contract between an HMO and the medical provider,
see J. KRESS & J. SINGER, supra note 251, at 63-68.
253. See, e.g., Kissam & Johnson, Health Maintenance Organizations and Federal
Law: Toward a Theory of Limited Reformmongering, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1163, 1164 (1976);
Note, supra note 252, at 890. For a description of the fee-for-service method as utilized
traditionally by insurers, see Kissam & Johnson, supra, at 1164 n.4. See also Stern, supra
note 251, at 89 (arguing that "[t]he development of HMO's as an alternative source of
health care would, at its best, help to control costs, improve the accessibility, availability,
and quality of care, and add a much-needed element of competition and pluralism to the
health care system").
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cause of their prepayment structure, HMOs operate on a fixed
budget; thus, they have a strong incentive to minimize costs. 254
HMOs received broad federal support in the early 1970s because
their inherent efficiencies were thought to answer the problem of
rapidly increasing health care costs. 255 Furthermore, the HMOs'
cost-control incentive, in theory at least, translates into better
health for HMO members.2 56 Under the fee-for-service system a
physician's fees are greater when the patient is sicker and, conse-
quently, requires more intense treatment. 57 In contrast, HMOs
find it more profitable to keep members healthy by treating them
during the early stages of illness when treatment is less expen-
sive.258 For their part, patients will want to seek early treatment
because, unlike the fee-for-service payment situation, they will in-
cur no out-of-pocket expense for the visit.2 59 In addition to having
the incentive to control costs, HMOs also have the power to con-
trol costs. Unlike fee-for-service insurers, HMOs contract directly
with providers and oversee the day-to-day administration of
2610
services.
b. Analysis
The HMO structure incorporates many of the characteristics
that the corporate practice doctrine was designed to eradicate.2 61
HMOs have the potential to impose lay control over a physician's
treatment decisions. For example, because of its fixed-budget
structure, HMO management has an incentive to pressure physi-
cians not to order expensive tests for patients that management
deems to be of marginal diagnostic value. Furthermore, the HMOs'
legislated privilege to solicit patients undermines the commercial-
ism justification of the corporate practice rule. By permitting solic-
itation, Congress apparently did not share the concerns of the
254. See Kissam & Johnson, supra note 253 at 1164; Stern, supra note 251, at 89.
255. See Kissam & Johnson, supra note 253, at 1165 n.10. See generally Note, supra
note 252.
256. See Rosoff, supra note 251, at 139; see also Stern, supra note 251, at 89 (stating
that "[b]ecause the HMO has a predetermined enrolled population and centralized medical
facilities and records, it also provides the opportunity for more effective monitoring and
review of the quality of care provided").
257. See Rosoff, supra note 251, at 139.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Kissam & Johnson, supra note 253, at 1164 n.4.
261. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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AMA establishment 26 2 and earlier courts,26 3 which feared that free-
market activities would debase the profession. Finally, inherent in
the HMO structure is the risk that a physician's loyalty will be
divided between employer and patient, a risk no less evident in the
HMO structure than in the corporate structures held illegal under
the corporate practice doctrine decades earlier.
Prior to the HMO enabling legislation passed by Congress in
1973,264 HMO advocates pointed to the corporate practice rule as
one of the primary legal barriers hindering HMO development. 65
One of the early federal HMO enabling proposals would have ex-
plicitly preempted state corporate practice rules for nonprofit
HMOs.6 6 Contrary to this earlier proposal, however, the final
HMO legislation did not explicitly preempt state corporate prac-
tice prohibitions.267 The legislation did supersede state laws and
practices which required that a medical society approve the fur-
nishing of services of HMOs, that physicians constitute all or part
of an HMO's governing body, that all or part of the area physicians
262. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1982).
265. See Hansen, supra note 183, at 211-13; Holley & Carlson, supra note 187, at 657-
58; Note, supra note 252, at 960-62.
266. See Note, supra note 252, at 962 n.52. The proposed legislation would have elimi-
nated the corporate practice prohibition for nonprofit organizations on the condition that a
reviewing board find the arrangements not to cause lay interference with physicians' profes-
sional acts. Id.
267. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10(a) (1982). The relevant part of the HMO statute states as
follows:
In the case of any entity-
(1) which cannot do business as a health maintenance organization in a state in
which it proposes to furnish basic and supplemental health services because that State
by law, regulation, or otherwise-
(A) requires as a condition to doing business in that state that a medical soci-
ety approve the furnishing of services by the entity,
(B) requires that physicians constitute all or a percentage of its governing
body,
(C) requires that all physicians or a percentage of physicians in the locale
participate or be permitted to participate in the provision of services for the en-
tity, or
(D) requires that the entity meet requirements for insurers of health care ser-
vices doing business in that state respecting initial capitalization and establish-
ment of financial reserves against insolvency, and
(2) for which a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee was made under this sub-
chapter or which is a qualified health maintenance organization for purposes of section
300e-9 of this title (relating to employees' health benefits plans), such requirements
shall not apply to that entity so as to prevent it from operating as a health mainte-
nance organization in accordance with section 300e of this title.
Id.
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participate as providers for the HMO, or that the HMO refrain
from soliciting members through advertising services.268
The argument could be made that by not expressly preempt-
ing state corporate practice prohibitions, Congress intended to al-
low these prohibitions to stand. Given the obvious barrier that
these prohibitions pose to HMO development, however, it is un-
likely that Congress, if committed to the HMO alternative, in-
tended to allow the prohibitions to stand. Congress probably con-
cluded that the other preemption provisions were sufficient to
preempt corporate practice prohibitions. According to one com-
mentator, the HMO legislation implicitly preempts the common-
law prohibition.26 9 Thus, any application of the prohibition would
conflict with the legislation so directly that preemption would ap-
pear certain.27 0
The 1973 HMO legislation and the subsequent proliferation
and acceptance of HMOs evidence the modern disutility of the cor-
porate practice prohibition. The legislation itself is a sweeping fed-
eral health care policy statement in favor of a corporate-based,
competitive health market. The legislation eschews a medical econ-
omy dominated by independent, fee-for-service practitioners.
2. Freestanding Emergency Clinics
a. Structure and Function
Freestanding emergency clinics, also known as primary care
centers or emergicenters, "' have become increasingly popular in
recent years as a health care delivery alternative. 72 According to
one account, these clinics have grown from 180 centers in 1981 to
268. Id. While all of the provisions reproduced supra in note 267 were carried over
from the Conference Committee Report into the text of the legislation, express language in
the Report preempting state laws that "bar incorporated individuals or associations from
providing health care services" was excluded from the HMO legislation. SEN. J. CONF. REP.
No. 621, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 55, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3121,
3149-50.
269. See Kissam & Johnson, supra note 253, at 1218.
270. Id. at 1218 n.364.
271. Many FECs have stopped characterizing themselves as "emergency" centers. In-
stead they are calling the centers ambulatory care centers or ACCs. Even the National Asso-
ciation of Freestanding Emergency Centers (NAFEC) changed its name to the National As-
sociation for Ambulatory Care (NAFAC). The change was made because centers with the
word "emergency" in their name often are subject to state regulation. See Riffer, Freestand-
ing Emergency and Surgery Centers Proliferate, HospITALs, Dec. 16, 1984, at 50.
272. See Zaremski & Fohrman, The Emergicenter: Has Its Time Arrived?, 11 L., MED.
& HEALTH CARE 4 (1983); see also Powills, Size of FEC Market a Matter of Opinion, Hospi-
TALS, May 16, 1985, at 44; Riffer, supra note 271, at 50.
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2500 in early 1986.2178 Another study foresees continued growth in
the number of FECs for the near future. 4
Although FECs are organized according to various models,
they share certain similarities. Designed to cater to the demands of
the public, emergicenters offer longer hours than doctors' offices,
do not require appointments, usually have short waits for service,
and charge less than hospital emergency rooms. 275 Typically, FECs
are owned by either physicians, hospitals, or investor-owned corpo-
rations.27 e According to an AMA report, physician-owned FECs fall
into one of three organizational models.277 First, a solo practitioner,
a physician partnership, or a physician-organized professional cor-
poration may form a private practice model.78 Physician control in
these FECs is complete. Second, a FEC formed by physicians may
contract with a management services company io provide specific
administrative services according to the needs of the practice.27 9
Although the physician-owners operating under this model
273. See Wessel, supra note 8, at 1, col. 1. Obtaining an accurate census of FECs is
difficult because different polling groups define FECs differently. For instance, the Ameri-
can Hospital Association states that there exists no more than 25 true FECs-those that are
open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. See Powills, supra note 272, at 43.
274. See Satellite and Commercial Medical Clinics, Report of the Board of Trustees:
Part I, 253 JA.MA. 645, 646 (1985) [hereinafter Trustees Report: Part 1]. The 1983 study
conducted by Orkand Corporation
projects continued dynamic growth (at declining percentage levels) in the number of
freestanding centers throughout 1983, 1984, and much of 1985, with net increases level-
ing off at about 400 units per year beginning 1986 and continuing through 1990. On
these assumptions, it estimates 1,100 centers in operation by the end of 1983, 2,900 by
1986, and 4,500 by 1990.
Id.
One reason for the growth of FECs is the enormous number of potential FEC patients.
One estimate indicates that 60% to 85% of all patients admitted to hospital emergency
rooms could be treated at emergicenters. See Entin, supra note 187, at 401.
275. See Entin, supra note 187, at 400. For a comparison of FECs to traditional health
care delivery systems, see Zaremski & Fohrman, supra note 272, at 5-6.
276. See Trustees Report: Part I, supra note 274, at 648. The 1983 Orkand study
reported that of centers responding, 73% were owned by physicians, 7% by hospitals and
the remainder by nonhospital, nonphysician corporations. Id. According to the Trustees Re-
port, however, ownership of FECs by publicly-held corporations is rare. Id. at 647. The
AMA anticipates that this type of FEC will become more prevalent as business corpora-
tions, venture capitalists, and investment bankers enter the health care industry. Id. at 647-
48. Corporate chains appear to be taking a great interest in ownership of freestanding surgi-
cal centers. As of July 1984, 57.9% of the surgical centers under construction were corporate
owned. See Riffer, supra note 271, at 50.
277. See Trustees Report: Part I, supra note 274, at 646-47.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 646. The management services package may include site selection studies,
building and equipment design, an operational plan, a staff-training system, a computerized
accounting system, and an advertising program. Id.
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purchase certain services, they still maintain ultimate control over
all aspects of the practice. 28 0 Last, physicians may purchase an
FEC franchise.28 ' Under this arrangement, physicians are obligated
to follow the franchisor's operations format in return for use of the
franchise name. These arrangements usually require payment of a
franchise fee, based on gross revenues, for a management program
and advertising services. 28 2 Franchisors typically retain control
over site selection, design specifications, range of services offered,
and composition of center staff.28 3 The AMA report also notes that,
much like FEC franchises, some physician-owned FECs may open
standardized branch offices. The physician-owners then employ
other physicians on a full-time basis to staff the branches.8 4
Hospitals also are establishing FECs as satellites to their own
operations.8 5 Sonfe of these centers are directly financed and man-
aged by the hospital. Others are organized around contractual ar-
rangements that transfer management functions to physicians, but
retain actual ownership of the center in the hospital.286
Many corporate-owned FECs contract with independent con-
tractor physicians or professional corporations to provide the
FEC's medical services. 2817 The investor-owned corporation typi-
cally maintains control over management decisions and adminis-
trative functions, but grants control over medical issues to the phy-
sicians.288 In one corporate FEC chain a professional corporation
leases the center from the chain and executes a "management ser-
vices agreement" with the chain.8 9 Pursuant to the agreement, the
professional corporation is responsible for staffing the center and
overseeing the quality of health care delivered. 290 The corporate
owner trains support staff and appoints a full-time manager to
280. Id.
281. Id. at 646-47.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 647.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 647-48.
286. Id. at 648.
287. Id. at 647.
288. See id. But see Punch, supra note 185, at 34. A spokesman for Humana Inc.,
owner of the MedFirst FEC chain, stated, "All medical decisions are the doctors' and all
business decisions, such as staffing, are made in conjunction with the doctors." Punch, supra
note 185, at 34.
289. See Trustees Report: Part I, supra note 274, at 647. The FEC chain presented is
MedFirst, which is owned by Humana Inc., a publicly-held corporation.
290. Id. The corporation also indicates that physicians retain discretion over accepta-
bility of support staff, determine which hospitals should be utilized by patients, and estab-
lish their professional fees. Id.
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oversee the center's administration.29 ' The corporate-owner con-
trols site selection, advertising, finances, purchases of supplies and
equipment, and the FEC's hours of operation.9 2
Under the financial structure of a corporate-owned FEC, the
professional corporation pays a percentage of the gross revenues to
the parent firm as a fee for advertising, management services, and
leasing of the facility.2 9 3 Principals of the professional corporation
are compensated as shareholders.294 Physicians employed by the
professional corporation are paid a salary and, in addition, may re-
ceive a benefit package or a percentage of their own fee-for-service
billings.295 Physicians working part-time at the FEC are paid by
the hour.9
b. Analysis
The commercial nature of FECs" 7 raises stark conflicts with
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Corporate-owned
FECs pose the most obvious problem. These FECs defy all public
policy bases for the corporate practice prohibition.2"8 First, a great
deal of lay influence is present in the operation of a FEC practice.
Corporate owners of FECs argue that they exercise no control over
physicians' medical decisions.2 99 Nevertheless, the required man-
agement services agreement, which guarantees the full-time pres-
ence of a corporation-appointed manager and provides for almost
every aspect of the FEC's administration,300 imposes on the physi-
cian the kind of lay control that the corporate practice doctrine
would prevent.301 Second, although the doctrine was designed to
291. Id.
292. Id. Note that the Humana spokesman presents a division of responsibility be-
tween physicians and corporate owners much different from that presented in the Trustees
Report. See supra note 288.
293. See Trustees Report: Part I, supra note 274, at 647.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. One commentator has characterized FECs as first aid stations designed around a
business ethic rather than a medical ethic. See Robbins, Ethical Questions Surrounding
"Neighborhood Emergency Centers". Balancing Access with Quality, 8 J. EMERGENCY
NURSING 264 (1982).
298. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
299. See Trustees Report: Part I, supra note 274, at 647 (stating that the operating
agreements negotiated between corporations and FEC medical staff "seek to achieve a divi-
sion of authority along business management/medical management lines"); see also supra
note 288 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 289-92 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
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eliminate commercialism in medicine, FECs typically are run for
profit.30 2 Third, corporate ownership raises the issue of divided
physician loyalty30 3 because the physician has a duty to the patient
to provide necessary care, but also is obligated to the parent corpo-
ration to create revenue. Some individuals argue that because cor-
porate-owned FECs contract with group practices or professional
corporations rather than employ physicians directly, FECs avoid
corporate practice prohibition laws .3 0 This logic, while it may skirt
corporate practice prohibitions in some jurisdictions,305 fails to ap-
preciate that lay investors realize profits from the professional ef-
forts of physicians. Thus, FECs create a situation that the corpo-
rate practice prohibition traditionally was designed to prevent.
Hospital-owned and physician-owned FECs also create situa-
tions that conflict with the various bases of the corporate practice
doctrine. In the pursuit of profit, hospitals, themselves corporate
entities, may exercise an excessive amount of control over FEC
physicians and, thus, be deemed to be practicing medicine. Physi-
cian-owners, while maintaining greater autonomy over their FEC
practices than corporate-owned FECs, become subject to their own
conflicting interests. The AMA Board of Trustees has stated that
"[t]he commercial motivations of for-profit enterprise conflict with
professionalism to the extent that they result in the subordination
of a physician's fiduciary obligations to patients to his own finan-
cial self-interests."306
Health law practitioners recognize the conflict between FECs
and the corporate practice doctrine.0 These practitioners ac-
knowledge that in many jurisdictions corporate practice prohibi-
tions have gone unenforced for many years,308 yet disagree over
302. See Entin, supra note 187, at 401; Zaremski & Fohrman, supra note 272, at 5.
See generally Trustees Report: Part I, supra note 274, at 645-46; Trustees Report: Part II,
supra note 137, at 1314-15.
303. See Trustees Report: Part II, supra note 137, at 1314; Veatch, Ethical Dilemmas
of For-Profit Enterprises in Health Care, in THE NEw HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT 125, 131
(B. Gray ed. 1983).
304. See Punch, supra note 185, at 34. The AMA's associate general counsel stated,
"You can circumscribe [corporate practice laws] very easily by setting up a for-profit corpo-
ration which contracts with group practices of physicians. . . ." See also Entin, supra note
187, at 432 (explaining that an agreement between a corporation and a group of physicians,
clearly identifying the physicians as independent contractors, will minimize the risk of cor-
porate practice violation).
305. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
306. Trustees Report: Part II, supra note 137, at 1314.
307. See Entin, supra note 187, at 430-32; Trustees Report: Part II, supra note 137, at
1315-19; Punch, supra note 185, at 32-34.
308. Punch, supra note 185, at 32. William H. Roach, Jr., a health law attorney with
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whether the proliferation of FECs will spark renewed interest in
applying the doctrine.3 09 Some believe that freestanding emergency
centers can be structured to avoid any corporate practice con-
cerns.31 0 Others believe that as competition increases among FECs,
either the FECs will attack one another with charges of corporate
practice 31 1 or the states will invoke corporate practice prohibitions
to protect the autonomy of local physicians.12 One case concerning
a multichain FEC has already reached the courts. In Flashner v.
Schemberger31 3 a former physician-partner in the Flashner Medi-
cal Partnership, which operates twenty-five FECs in three states,
sued the partnership for inducing him to violate corporate practice
prohibitions. 314
The controversy over FECs provides an opportunity for the
states to align the corporate practice doctrine with the realities of
the modern health care industry. The proliferation of FECs indi-
cates that commercialized medicine is becoming increasingly ac-
cepted. Even the AMA Board of Trustees, although concerned
about physicians' professional autonomy, accepts the existence of
for-profit enterprises in medical practice. 5 States should facilitate
the development of FECs and similar health care delivery systems
by amending their medical practice acts to reflect the corporate-
physician relationships now deemed acceptable. In addition, courts
the Chicago firm of Gardner, Carton & Douglas, notes that states overlook instances in
which corporate practice prohibitions are violated. Id. The AMA's associate general counsel
stated that except for Texas, corporate practice prohibitions were not being enforced any-
where. Id. at 34.
309. See id. at 32.
310. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
311. Punch, supra note 185, at 32.
312. Id. The executive director of NAFEC (presently NAFAC) stated, "Every state
has a medical practice act stating that corporations can't practice medicine. When the
[FEC] chains roll out, the question arises as to how much control the local physicians have
in practicing medicine . . . ." Id.
313. See Rosoff, supra note 185, at 4.
314. Id.
315. Both parts of the AMA Board of Trustees Report on FECs indicate a general
willingness to accept the existence of for-profit enterprises in medical care. See Trustees
Report: Part I, supra note 274, at 645; Trustees Report: Part II, supra note 137, at 1314.
The Report discusses the regulatory and legal status of FECs, but does not condemn com-
mercialism. Instead, the Board of Trustees leaves the issue of commercialism to individual
practitioners:
Noting that it is, in the final analysis, the professional responsibility of each physician
to acknowledge the primacy of patient and public welfare, the Board concluded that
the disruptive influence of commercialism on the physician-patient relationship may be
mitigated by physicians' reaffirmation of commitment to the ideals of professionalism.
Trustees Report: Part II, supra note 137, at 1315.
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dealing with corporate practice cases must reexamine the doc-
trine's public policy bases rather than rely on precedents devel-
oped before the advent of a competitive and commercialized health
care economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The corporate practice of medicine prohibition arose in re-
sponse to fears that corporate involvement in medicine would re-
strict physicians' independence and commercialize medical prac-
tice. The AMA, the medical profession's organizing body, enacted
ethical restrictions against corporate practice. Courts applied the
prohibition against corporate practice based on broad interpreta-
tions of state medical practice acts and for reasons of public policy.
In recent years few cases have arisen concerning the doctrine. As
corporate involvement in health care intensifies, however, invoca-
tion of the corporate practice prohibition becomes more likely.
This prohibition threatens the development of nontraditional
health care delivery systems in many states. For innovation of de-
livery systems to continue, state courts and legislatures should
modify corporate practice prohibitions to reflect current views on
physician autonomy and the role of commercialism in medicine.
Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz
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